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1Differentially Private Consensus-Based
Distributed Optimization
Mehrdad Showkatbakhsh, Can Karakus, Suhas Diggavi
Abstract—Data privacy is an important concern in learning,
when datasets contain sensitive information about individuals.
This paper considers consensus-based distributed optimization
under data privacy constraints. Consensus-based optimization
consists of a set of computational nodes arranged in a graph,
each having a local objective that depends on their local data,
where in every step nodes take a linear combination of their
neighbors’ messages, as well as taking a new gradient step. Since
the algorithm requires exchanging messages that depend on local
data, private information gets leaked at every step. Taking (ε,δ )-
differential privacy (DP) as our criterion, we consider the strategy
where the nodes add random noise to their messages before
broadcasting it, and show that the method achieves convergence
with a bounded mean-squared error, while satisfying (ε,δ )-DP.
By relaxing the more stringent ε-DP requirement in previous
work, we strengthen a known convergence result in the literature.
We conclude the paper with numerical results demonstrating the
effectiveness of our methods for mean estimation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data privacy is a central concern in statistics and machine
learning when utilizing sensitive databases such as financial
accounts and health-care. Thus, it is important to design ma-
chine learning algorithms which protect users’ privacy while
maintaining acceptable level of accuracy. In this paper, we
consider a distributed framework in which N nodes aim to
minimize a global cost function f (x) = ∑i∈[N] fi(x),x ∈ X
where fi is only available to the i-th node and contains
sensitive information about individuals trusting this node. We
study the consensus-based gradient distributed algorithm in
which nodes broadcasts their local estimates and update them
accordingly based on what they received from the neighbors.
However, revealing the local estimate may expose privacy of
individual data points and cares must be taken into account
to protect the sensitive information from an adversary that
oversees all messages among nodes.
Differential Privacy (DP) is a well-known notion of privacy
[1] and found application in many domains (we refer readers to
[1] and [2] ). DP assumes a strong adversary that has access to
all data points except one and rigorously limits inferences of an
adversary about each individual, thereby ensuring robustness
of the privacy guarantee to side information. Furthermore, it
does not assume any distribution on the underlying data and
guarantees it gives do not depend on such assumptions. In
this framework, there has been a long line of work studying
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differentialy private machine learning algorithms, see [2] and
references therein. Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) plays
an important role in the supervised learning setup and our
work is tied to private ERM in distributed setup.
The algorithm in this work is not new and is a small
modification of the (sub)-distributed gradient descent (DGD)
algorithm [3], [4] which has been analyzed before in the
literature of differential privacy [5]. The main novelty of
our work lies in the new analysis that leads to a stronger
convergence results. Contribution of this work is as follows:
• We determine the variance of the noise needed to en-
sure DP privacy in this iterative and distributed setup
(Theorem 1) from basic calculations, instead of using
composition theorems [1]. This approach gives a tighter
bound for the noise variances and let us increase the
accuracy by optimizing over the variances.
• We derive the non-ergodic convergence behavior in this
setup, thereby showing that by suitably choosing the noise
variance the parameter converges to a ball around the
optimal point. We further characterize the radius of the
ball as a function of privacy parameters, i.e., ε and δ
(Theorem 2).
Related work. There is long line of research devoted to
differentially private ERM in the centralized set-up, in which
a trusted party has access to a private and sensitive database
while the adversary observes only the final end model [6],
[7]. A number of approaches exist for this set up with the
convex loss function, which can be roughly classified into three
categories. The first type of approaches is to inject properly
scaled additive noise to the output of a non-DP algorithm
which was first proposed by [8] for this problem and later on
is extended by [9] and [10]. The second type of approaches is
to perturb the objective function which is again introduced in
[8]. The third approach delves into the first order optimization
algorithms and perturbs gradients at each step to maintain the
DP, [7] was one of the earliest work in this domain.
In our work, there does not exist a central trusted entity
and data is distributed among N nodes that motivates the
use of the distributed optimization algorithms. Differentially
private distributed optimization has been explored before in
[5], where authors considered the similar problem under ε-DP
constraint. It is well-known that ε-DP is too stringent condition
and often rises to non-acceptable accuracy. The convergence
bound of [5] does not diminish as the privacy requirement
weakens, i.e., the convergence is not exact even without any
privacy requirement. We emphasize that the main novelty of
our work lies in the analysis of the algorithms and the resulting
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2theoretical guarantees.
Paper organization. In section II, we give a brief overview
of differential privacy followed by introducing the problem.
Section III introduces the main results in which we establish
the condition under which the distributed algorithm is differ-
entially private and the convergence results. In section IV, we
give the proof outline of Theorems 1 and 2. We demonstrate
our numerical experiments in Section V. Section VI concludes
the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we review the notion of differential privacy
and the Gaussian mechanism which are building block of our
algorithm. In the second part, we give the precise problem
formulation along with the overview of the algorithm which
we consider in this work.
A. Differential Privacy
Let D := {d1, · · · ,dN} be a database containing N points in
the universe D. Two databases D and D′ are called neighbors
when they differ in at most one data point, we use the notation
D′ ∼ D to denote this relation.
A randomized mechanism M is differentially private if
evaluated on D and D′ produces outputs that have similar
statistical distributions. Formally speaking,
Definition 1 ((ε,δ )-Differential Privacy). A randomized
mechanism M is (ε,δ )-differentially private, if for any S ⊆
Range(M ),
P [M (D) ∈ S]≤ eεP[M (D′) ∈ S]+δ . (1)
An equivalent characterization of (ε,δ )-DP can be stated
based on the tail bound on the privacy loss random variable
that is the log ratio of the probability density functions1 of
M (D) and M (D′).
Proposition 1 (See Lemma 3.17 in [1]). A randomized mech-
anism M is (ε,δ )-differentially private if the log-likelihood
ratio when evaluating on two neighboring databases remains
bounded with probability at least 1−δ , i.e.,
P
[
| log pdfD(o)
pdfD′(o)
| ≤ ε
]
≥ 1−δ , (2)
where pdfD (pdfD′ ) is the pdf of M (D) (M (D
′)) and o is
drawn according to pdfD.
A common design paradigm to approximate a deterministic
function q :D|D|→ Rp with a differentailly private mechanism
is by adding a properly scaled Gaussian noise to the output
of q. The scale of the noise depends on how far that query
maps two neighboring databases which is formalized through
the notion of sensitivity.
Definition 2 (L2 sensitivity). Let q be a deterministic function
that maps a database to a vector in Rp. The L2 sensitivity of
q is defined as
∆2(q) = max
D′∼D
‖q(D)−q(D′)‖2. (3)
1In this work, we assume the induced measures are absolutely cts wrt to
the Lebesgue so pdf always exists.
We can define the L1 sensitivity similarly.
Throughout this work, we focus on Gaussian Mechanism to
ensure differential privacy.
Definition 3 (Gaussian mechanism). Given any (deterministic)
function q :D|D|→ Rp, the Gaussian Mechanism is defined as:
M (D,q,σ) = q(D)+n, (4)
where n is a Gaussian random variable with a zero mean and
the variance of σ .
It is well known [1] that for the proper value of the noise
variance, Gaussian Mechanism preserves (ε,δ )-DP.
Proposition 2 (See for example Theorem 3.22 in [1]). For
a deterministic function q : D|D| → Rp, Gaussian mecha-
nism M (D,q,σ) preserves (ε,δ )-DP for ε < 1 if σ2 ≥
2log(1.25/δ )∆2(q)/ε2, where ∆2(q) is the L2-sensitivity of the
function q.
B. Problem Formulation
We consider a distributed optimization set-up where N
nodes aim to collaboratively minimize an additive cost func-
tion f (x) =∑i∈[N] fi(x),x ∈X where X is the domain of the
problem and [N]
4
= {1, . . . ,N}. In this problem, nodes want
to minimize f (x) while keeping each data point private. We
adopt the (ε,δ )-differential privacy (DP) as a measure of the
privacy.
Assumption 1 (Domain). The domain of the optimization
X ⊆ Rp is a closed compact and convex set and x∗ ∈ X
where x∗ ∈ argminx∈Rp f (x).
In this setup, N nodes communicate over a connected and
undirected graph G := (V ,E ) where V := {1, · · · ,N} is the
set of vertices and E ⊆V ×V denotes the set of edges. Nodes
can only communicate with their neighbors, which we denote
neighbors of node i with Ni for i ∈ [N]. We assume that
each node has access to one of the summands of the global
objective function, fi(x). Throughout this paper, the following
assumption holds for the local objective functions2.
Assumption 2 (Bounded Gradient). fi(x) for i ∈ [N] are G-
Lipschitz for x ∈X ,
‖ fi(x)− fi(y)‖2 ≤ G‖x− y‖2, ∀x,y ∈X , i ∈ [N]. (5)
Assumption 3 (Smoothness). fi(x) for i ∈ [N] are L-smooth
over an open set containing X ,
‖∇ fi(x)−∇ fi(y)‖2 ≤ L‖x− y‖2, ∀x,y ∈X , i ∈ [N]. (6)
In order to have convergence of the parameter itself, it is
well-known that the strong convexity of the cost functions are
needed.
Assumption 4 (Strong convexity). fi(x) for i ∈ [N] are µ-
strongly convex over an open set containing X ,
〈 fi(x)− fi(y),x− y〉 ≥ µ‖x− y‖22, ∀x,y ∈X , i ∈ [N]. (7)
2Assumption 3 and 4 inherently state that the smoothness and strong
convexity parameters should be the same, however, without loss of generality
we can take the maximum L and minimum µ across all nodes.
3In the context of empirical risk minimization local cost
functions are the empirical risk associated with data points
stored in nodes, i.e.,
fi(x) := ∑
d∈Di
l(x;d),
where Di ⊆ D is the set of sensitive data points stored in the
i-th node and l(x,d) is the loss function.
Adversary model. In this problem, the adversary can overhear
all the messages between nodes without any computational
assumption. Nodes aim to preserve DP with respect to the
sensitive data points ∪i∈[N]Di .
C. Overview of the algorithm
We study the consensus-based distributed optimization al-
gorithm where nodes update their local estimate by combining
the information received from the neighbors. As opposed to the
standard Distributed Gradient Descent (DGD), our proposed
algorithm consists of two phases.
Stage I. In the first stage of the algorithm, similarly to
the distributed gradient descent, nodes iteratively perform the
consensus step followed by a local Gradient Descent (GD)
step. Let us denote the local estimate of the i-th node with
xi(t).
xi(t) = ProjX (zi(t)−ηt∇ fi(zi(t))) , t ≤ T (8)
where
zi(t) = ProjX
(
∑
j∈Ni
wi jy j(t)
)
, (9)
here y j(t) is the message sent by node j ∈Ni to its neighbors,
and
ProjX (x)
4
= argminy∈X ‖x− y‖2 (10)
is the Euclidean projection onto the set X . The update (8)
shows that node i updates it’s local estimate by taking a proper
average of the messages sent by its neighbors and descending
it through ∇ fi(zi(t)), wi j is the weight associated to neighbors
of node i and it’s zero for j /∈Ni, and T ∈ N is the number
of steps in Stage II.
Assumption 5 (Doubly Stochastic Weight Matrix). The weight
matrix, W := [wi j] is a doubly stochastic matrix with non-
negative entries. We denote the second largest eigenvalue of
W in absolute value with β :=max{|λ2(W )|, |λN(W )|}, where
1 = λ1(W ) ≥ λ2(W ) . . . ≥ λN(W ) > −1 are eigenvalues of W
sorted in a descending order.
It is well-known that using a fixed step size the classical
DGD converges to a neighborhood of the optimal point with
the size proportional to the step-size [3], [4]. Convergence
to the exact point can be derived by using a diminishing step
size (see [4] and references therein). Therefore throughout this
work, step-size ηt is chosen Θ( 1t ).
As opposed to the classical DGD, nodes do not send their
local estimate directly since each step of GD may reveal
information about the underlying sensitive data points. Nodes
perturb their local estimate by a Gaussian mechanism to
control the privacy leakage. In particular, nodes broadcast
yi(t+1) = xi(t)+ni(t), i ∈ {1, · · · ,N}, t ≤ T, (11)
where ni(t) is a zero mean additive Gaussian noise with the
variance of M2t , and xi(t) is the local estimate of node i at t.
Each step of GD exposes the sensitive data points to the
adversary. Hence to ensure the same level of privacy additional
noise needed as the number of GD steps increases. Noise
added to each stage of GD avoids the local estimates to
converge to a common value therefore in our proposed method
nodes apply GD only for T steps, and afterwards nodes switch
to a purely consensus mode to agree on a common value.
Stage II. After T steps of Gradient descent, nodes iterates
only though the consensus steps. Note that ∇ fi in (8) is the
only source in which the privacy of sensitive data points may
leak. Therefore in the second stage of the algorithm, nodes
broadcast their local estimate precisely and update their local
estimate according to:
yi(t) = xi(t−1), i ∈ [N], t > T
xi(t) = ∑
j∈[N]
wi jy j(t), (12)
.
Note that projection operator is not needed in (12) due to the
convexity of the optimization domain (Assumption 1). Nodes
update their local estimates until a stopping criterion is met.
One common stopping criterion is the relative change in the
value of each node.
Algorithm 1: Steps at Node i for the proposed private
distributed algorithm.
1 Set yi(1) = 0;
2 for t = 1, · · · ,T do
3 Update yi(t) according to (11) and broadcast yi(t);
4 Receive y j(t) from j ∈N j ;
5 Update xi(t) according to (8) ;
6 end
7 for t = T +1, · · · do
8 Broadcast yi(t) := xi(t−1) ;
9 Receive y j(t) from j ∈N j ;
10 Update xi(t) according to (12) ;
11 end
Notation. We represent set of natural and real numbers with N
and R respectively. Throughout this work, we reserve the low-
ercase bold letters for the aggregated parameters of nodes at a
given time t, i.e., we use the notation x(t) = [x1(t); · · · ;xN(t)],
y(t) = [y1(t); · · · ;yN(t)], z(t) = [z1(t); · · · ;zN(t)] and n(t) =
[n1(t); · · · ;nN(t)]. The identity matrix is denoted with Ip ∈Rp
and we use 1N to represent a vector of length N of ones. We
use ‖a‖ to denote l2-norm of a vector a while ‖A‖ represents
the operator norm of a matrix A, ‖A‖ 4= sup‖x‖=1 ‖Ax‖, and ⊗
denotes the Kronecker product. In this paper we reserve the
notation [N] to represent {1, · · · ,N} for any N ∈ N.
4III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we give the main results of this work.
First we derive conditions on the noise variances under which
the distributed problem is (ε,δ )-differentially private against
an adversary that oversees all the communications among
nodes. We emphasize that one of the main contribution of
this work is to relate the noise variances at different steps to
the privacy parameters (ε and δ ) directly rather than using
basic or advanced composition theorems. Afterward we state
the convergence result.
The variance of the noise to ensure (ε,δ )-DP depends on
the L2 sensitivity of the algorithm. In the context of distributed
optimization, we need to make sure DP is satisfied despite
multiple rounds of communications in this iterative scheme.
Definition 4 (Conditional L2-sensitivity). Conditional L2-
sensitivity at round t, ∆(t) defined to be the maximum L2-norm
difference of xi(t) evaluated on two neighboring databases D
and D′ while having the same set of messages {y(k)}tk=1 up
until round t, i.e.,
∆(t) := sup
D∼D′
sup
i∈[N]
sup
{y(t)}tt=1
‖xDi (t)− xD
′
i (t)‖2, (13)
where xD
′
i (t) corresponds to the local parameter of node i of
the neighboring instance of the problem.
Proposition 3. The conditional L2-sensitivity of Algorithm 1
at round t ≤ T is bounded by 2ηtG, provided that Assumption
2 holds.
Proof. See Appendix.
Now we have the machinery to state the main theorem of
this section.
Theorem 1. The distributed algorithm is (ε,δ )-DP if nodes
perturb their local estimates by adding independent Gaussian
noise (11) and the following holds,
T
∑
t=1
∆2(t)
M2t
≤ ε
2
ε+2log 2δ
, (14)
where Mt is the scale of noise added in round t ≤ T .
Corollary 1. If Assumption 2 holds and
T
∑
t=1
η2t
M2t
≤ ε
2
4G2
(
ε+2log 2δ
) 4= κ(ε,δ ). (15)
then the distributed algorithm is (ε,δ )-DP.
Remark 1. A common practice to ensure differential privacy
in an iterative mechanism is to make each step differentially
private (with a stronger privacy guarantees) and combine
the privacy leakage using the basic or advanced composition
theorems [1]. Composition theorems do not take into account
the specific noise distribution and they often give loose results
for a given distribution while Theorem 1 takes the noise
distribution into account thereby giving a tighter result, i.e.,
smaller noise variances and therefore ensure a better utility.
Remark 2. In the literature of DP for iterative processes, it is
common that in order to ensure (ε,δ )-DP we make each step
(ε ′,δ ′)-DP, where ε ′ and δ ′ are computed using a composition
theorem. It implicitly assumes that we need to have the same
privacy requirement at each step, which is not necessary
needed. Theorem 1 connects the noise variances across time
to the privacy parameters ε and δ directly and allows for a
meaningful assignment of privacy budget to different steps.
Remark 3. In the regime where ε 1 and δ  1N , the bound
in Theorem 1 can be written as,
T
∑
t=1
∆2(t)
M2t
≤ ε
2
2log 2δ
. (16)
Theorem 1 extends Lemma 2 the result of [5] to (ε,δ )-DP. It
gives us the condition under which the distributed algorithm is
(ε,δ )-DP. Working with (ε,δ )-DP as opposed to ε-DP in [5],
enables us to derive a convergence result with a diminishing
regret bound when the privacy requirement weakens.
In the rest of this section, we state the convergence result.
Let us denote the average of the local estimates with x¯(t)
4
=
1
N ∑i∈[N] xi(t). Theorem 2 summarizes the convergence result
for the mean parameter x¯(t).
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 2, 3 and 4 with the step
size ηt = µ+L2µL
1
t and noise scales M
2
t =
2
κ(ε,δ )
(
µ+L
2µL
)2 √
T
t
√
t ,
the distributed algorithm 1 is differentially private and the
following bound holds on E[‖x¯(T )− x∗‖22]:
E[‖x¯(T )− x∗‖22]≤CT
1
T
+ClogT
logT
T
+C 4√T
1
4
√
T
+C(ε,δ )
where x∗ minimizes, CT , ClogT , C 4√T and C(ε,δ ) are constants:
CT =
S(0)
N
ClogT = G2
(
1+
1
1−β
)(
µ+L
2µL
)2
C 4√T =
2
√
2pG√
κ(ε,δ )
(
4+
3
1−β
)(
µ+L
2µL
)2
C(ε,δ ) =
2p
κ(ε,δ )
(
µ+L
2µL
)2
κ(ε,δ ) =
ε2
4G2
(
ε+2log 2δ
)
Theorem 2 states that the average parameter converges to
a neighborhood of the optimal point with the rate of O( 14√T ).
The neighborhood scales with the privacy parameters (ε,δ )
which is O(
log 1δ
ε2 ). Recall the second stage of the distributed
algorithm only consists of the consensus steps in which local
parameters converge to a common value in a linear rate.
Corollary 2. Under Assumptions 2, 3 and 4 with the step
size ηt = µ+L2µL
1
t and noise scales M
2
t =
2
κ(ε,δ )
(
µ+L
2µL
)2 √
T
t
√
t ,
the distributed algorithm 1 is deferentially private and the
5following bound holds on the local parameters in the second
stage of the algorithm, t > T :
E[‖xi(t)− x∗‖22]≤ (17)
2Cexpβ 2t−2T +2CT
1
T
+2ClogT
logT
T
+2C√T
1√
T
+2C(ε,δ )
where CT , ClogT , C 4√T and C(ε,δ ) defined in Theorem 2 and
Cexp = 2‖x(T )‖2.
Proof. We observe that in Stage II, the mean parameter x¯(t)
remains constant since
x¯(t+1)
(a)
=
1
N
(
1TN⊗ IP
)
x(t+1)
(b)
=
1
N
(
1TN⊗ IP
)
(W ⊗ Ip)x(t)
(c)
=
1
N
(
1TN⊗ IP
)
x(t) = x¯(t), (18)
where we rewrote the mean parameter using the Kronecker
product in (a), (b) follows directly from (12) and we used
double stochasity of W in (c). Now we are ready to conclude
the result,
E[‖xi(t)− x∗‖22]
(a)
= E[‖xi(t)− x¯(t)+ x¯(T )− x∗‖22] (19)
(b)
≤ 2E[‖xi(t)− x¯(t)‖22]+2E[‖x¯(T )− x∗‖22],
where (a) follows from (18), and we used the inequality ‖a+
b‖22 ≤ 2‖a‖22+2‖b‖22 in (b). Using Theorem 2 and Lemma 1
it is straightforward to conclude the result.
IV. PRIVACY AND CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
In this section we outline the proofs for Theorems 1 and 2
followed by explanation and intuition.
A. Proof of Theorem 1
In the context of differential privacy, the corresponding
mechanism for the distributed algorithm maps D := ∪i∈[N]Di
to a sequence of messages {y(t)}t=1. In order to satisfy (ε,δ )-
DP, the output of the mechanism should satisfy the condition
(2) in Proposition 1. We proceed by writing the privacy loss
random and bounding it using the concentration inequalities.
The complete proof is included in Appendix.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
It is straightforward to verify this choice of ηt and Mt satisfy
(2) and therefore the distributed algorithm is deferentially
private. The proof of convergence consists of two parts. First
we show that the local parameters are bounded away from
mean in expectation, which is depicted in Lemma 1. The proof
proceeds by bounding deviation of the mean parameter to the
optimal point. Putting these together, the result follows.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 2, at round t, the following
bound holds on the distance of local parameters to the mean
for t < T ,
‖z(t)−1N⊗ z¯(t)‖ ≤ ‖n(t)‖+2
t−1
∑
s=1
β t−s‖n(s)‖ (20)
+
√
NG
t−1
∑
s=1
ηsβ t−s,
where z¯(t)
4
= 1N ∑i∈[N] zi(t). And the following holds for t ≥ T ,
‖x(t)−1N⊗ x¯(t)‖ ≤ β t−T‖x(T )‖. (21)
where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product.
Proof. See Appendix.
Let us define S(t)
4
= ∑i∈[N]E[‖xi(t)− x∗‖2] where x∗ is the
global minimum of f (x). Observe that,
E[‖x¯(t)− x∗‖2]≤ 1
N
S(t),
where we used
(
∑i∈[N] ‖ai‖
)2 ≤ N∑i∈[N] ‖ai‖2. Therefore we
proceed by bounding E[‖xi(t)− x∗‖2] for i ∈ [N] in order to
bound E[‖x¯(t)− x∗‖2].
Using the standard techniques, we bound terms ‖xi(t)−x∗‖2
one by one (for the clarity of the presentation, the time index
dropped wherever it is clear from the context). It is well known
that the projection operator is non-expansive, i.e., ‖ProjX (x)−
ProjX (y)‖ ≤ ‖x− y‖ for x,y ∈ Rp. Putting this together with
Assumption 1 (x∗ ∈X ) we have,
‖xi(t)− x∗‖2 = ‖ProjX (zi−ηt∇ fi(zi))−ProjX (x∗)‖2
≤ ‖zi(t)−ηt∇ fi(zi)− x∗‖2 (22)
In order to bound RHS of (22) we first present a lemma.
Lemma 2 (see for example Theorem 2.1.12 in [11]). Suppose
that f is L-smooth and µ-strongly over an open set containing
X , then we have,
〈x− y,∇ f (x)−∇ f (y)〉 ≥ c1‖x− y‖2+ c2‖∇ f (x)−∇ f (y)‖2,
(23)
where c1 =
µL
µ+L and c2 =
1
µ+L .
We proceed by expanding (22) and by adding and subtract-
ing ∇ fi(x∗),
‖xi(t)− x∗‖2
≤ ‖zi− x∗‖2−2ηt〈zi− x∗,∇ fi(zi)−∇ fi(x∗)+∇ fi(x∗)〉
+η2t ‖∇ fi(zi)‖2
(a)
≤ (1− 2µL
µ+L
ηt)‖zi− x∗‖2− 2ηtµ+L‖∇ fi(zi)−∇ fi(x
∗)‖22
+2ηt〈∇ fi(x∗),x∗− zi〉+η2t ‖∇ fi(zi)‖2
(b)
≤ (1− 2µL
µ+L
ηt)‖zi− x∗‖2+η2t G2+2ηt〈∇ fi(x∗),x∗− zi〉
(c)
≤ (1− 2µL
µ+L
ηt)‖zi− x∗‖2+η2t G2+2ηt〈∇ fi(x∗),x∗− z¯〉
−2ηt〈∇ fi(x∗),zi− z¯〉 (24)
where (a) follows from Lemma 2. We used Assumption 2
for (b), and (c) comes from adding and subtracting z¯. The
following lemma is useful in order to connect (24) to S(t).
Lemma 3. For any (fixed) x ∈X the following holds,
∑
i∈[N]
E[‖zi(t)− x‖2]≤ ∑
i∈[N]
E[‖xi(t−1)− x‖2]+dNM2t−1.
(25)
6Proof. See Appendix.
By summing up both sides of (24) across all nodes and
Lemma 3 we have:
S(t)≤ (1− 2µL
µ+L
ηt)S(t−1)+dN(1− 2µLµ+Lηt)M
2
t−1 (26)
+Nη2t G
2+2ηt ∑
i∈[N]
E[∇〈∇ fi(x∗), z¯− zi〉],
where we used the fact that x∗ is the global minimum and
therefore ∑i∈[N]∇ fi(x∗) = 0. It remains to bound the last term
in RHS of (26). Note that,
∑
i∈[N]
〈∇ fi(x∗), z¯− zi〉
(a)
≤ G ∑
i∈[N]
‖z¯(t)− zi(t)‖
(b)
≤ G
√
N‖z(t)−1N⊗ z¯(t)‖, (27)
where (a) follows from Cauchy-Schwartz inequality along
with Assumption 2 and we used
(
∑i∈[N] ‖ai‖
)2≤N∑i∈[N] ‖ai‖2
in (b). By applying Lemma 1 and taking expectation from both
sides of (27) we have,
∑
i∈[N]
E[∇〈∇ fi(x∗), z¯− zi〉] (28)
≤
√
pNMt +2
√
p
√
N
t−1
∑
s=1
Msβ t−s+G
√
N
t−1
∑
s=1
ηs.
Together with (26) we have the following recursion for S(t),
S(t)≤ (1− 2µL
µ+L
ηt)S(t−1)+ pN(1− 2µLµ+Lηt)M
2
t−1 (29)
+Nη2t G
2
+G
√
pNMt +2G
√
pN
t−1
∑
s=1
Msβ t−s+G2N
t−1
∑
s=1
ηsβ t−s.
By taking step size of ηt = µ+L2µL
1
t , we bound the cumulative
effect of each term in (29) for S(T ), where T is the number
of steps we are evaluating the gradient.
S(T )≤
T
∏
t=2
(1− 1
t
)S(0) (30)
+ pN
T
∑
t=1
M2t−1
T
∏
s=t
(1− 1
s
)
+G2N
T
∑
t=1
η2t
T
∏
s=t+1
(1− 1
s
)
+2G
√
pN
T
∑
t=1
ηtMt
T
∏
s=t+1
(1− 1
s
)
+2G
√
pN
T
∑
t=2
ηt
(
t−1
∑
s=1
Msβ t−s
)
T
∏
s=t+1
(1− 1
s
) (*1)
+G2N
T
∑
t=2
ηt
(
t−1
∑
s=1
ηsβ t−s
)
T
∏
s=t+1
(1− 1
s
) (*2)
The second term (30) is dominant in terms of the noise
variance, and the noise scales M2t =
2
κ(ε,δ )
(
µ+L
2µL
)2 √
T
t
√
t are
found by minimizing this term while taking condition (15)
in Theorem 1 as the constraint. Therefore,
S(T )≤S(0)
T
+
4pN
κ(ε,δ )
(
µ+L
2µL
)2
(31)
+G2N
(
µ+L
2µL
)2 logT
T
(32)
+
8
√
2pGN√
κ(ε,δ )
(
µ+L
2µL
)2 1
4
√
T
(33)
+
2
√
2pGN√
κ(ε,δ )
(
µ+L
2µL
)2( 3
1−β
)
1
4
√
T
(34)
+G2N
(
µ+L
2µL
)2( 1
1−β
)
logT
T
, (35)
where we used ∑Tt=1
1
t ≤ log(T ) and ∑Tt=1 1tα ≤ 1α+1 Tα+1 for
α >−1 to derive (31), (32) and (33). Going from (∗1) to (34)
follows from
T
∑
t=2
1
t
(
t−1
∑
s=1
t√
s 4
√
s
β t−s
)
=
T−1
∑
s=1
1
s3/4
(
T
∑
t=s+1
β t−s
)
≤ 1
1−β
T−1
∑
s=1
1
s1/2+c/4
≤ 4
1−β
4√T . (36)
And we used the following inequality to go from (∗2) to (35),
T
∑
t=2
1
t
(
t−1
∑
s=1
1
s
β t−s
)
=
T−1
∑
s=1
1
s
(
T
∑
t=s+1
β t−s
)
≤ 1
1−β
T−1
∑
s=1
1
s
≤ 1
1−β logT. (37)
The result follows immediately by E[‖x¯(T )− x∗‖22]≤ 1N S(T ).
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we assess the performance of our method on
decentralized mean estimation and we demonstrate the effect
of privacy parameters, number of gradient evaluation and
graph topology on the error. For the simulations, the communi-
cation graph is a connected Erdos-Renyi with edge probability
of pc = 0.6 and the weight matrix is W = I− 23λmax(L)L where
L is the Laplacian of the graph.
A. Distributed mean estimation
Distributed mean estimation is one of the classical problems
in the domain of differential privacy. Suppose data points lie
in a cube, X := [−R,R]p, where p is the dimension of the
points and R is the length of each side. In this setup, each
node has several data points and they aim to collaboratively
find the mean while keeping each data private and preserve
(ε,δ )-DP against an adversary that oversees all the messages.
We can write down this as the following distributed problem:
d¯ = min
x∈X
f (x) :=
1
2 ∑d∈∪i∈[N]Di
‖x−d‖22, (38)
7Fig. 1. The normalized error vs the number of GD steps, T for ε = 4 and
δ = 1/(N ∗Ni).
Fig. 2. The normalized error of the distributed mean estimation vs ε for a
fixed number of nodes and data points per node.
where Di is the set of points stored in node i, and fi(x) =
1
2 ∑d∈Di ‖x − d‖22 for i ∈ [N]. We generate data randomly
according to a truncated Gaussian distribution with mean of
0.7R and the unit variance. Sensitive data points are distributed
among 10 nodes each of which has 100 data points i.e.,
|Di| = 100. The conditional l2 sensitivity of the distributed
algorithm
∆(t) 4= sup
i∈[N]
sup
D∼D′
‖xDi (t)− xD
′
i (t)‖2
≤ sup
d,d′∈D
ηt‖d−d′‖2 ≤ 2R√pηt ,
and we generate Gaussian noise accordingly.
In order to demonstrate the convergence rate of the algo-
rithm, we run the distributed algorithm for different values of
T , number of gradient descent steps. Figure 1 illustrates the
effect of T on the normalized error ‖x¯(T )−d¯‖
2
2
‖d¯‖22
. It shows that
the error reduces until reaching a neighborhood of x∗, which
agrees with intuition provided by Theorem 2.
Figure 2 demonstrates the normalized error vs ε for different
values of δ ∈ {1/(N ∗Ni),1/(N ∗Ni)2,1/(N ∗Ni)3} where Ni
denotes the number of data points in each node, and T = 1000.
We observe that for a fixed value of δ by strengthening the
privacy guarantee the error increases O( 1ε2 ).
To observe the effect of the graph topology, we fix the
privacy parameters and vary the connectivity probability of the
Fig. 3. As the connectivity of the graph increases, we observe a decrease in
the error of the first node.
Fig. 4. The error versus number of data points per each node for a fixed T ,
ε = 4 and δ = 1/(N ∗Ni).
underlying graph by choosing pc ∈ {0.1,0.3,0.6,1}. Figure 3
illustrates the effect of connectivity on error of an individual
node ‖xi(T )−d¯‖
2
2
‖d¯‖22
.
Figure 4 illustrates the regret bound when the number
of data points per each node is increasing. We observe a
gain in the utility bound that is inline with Theorem 2.
Increasing the number of data points doesn’t increase the
conditional sensitivity while making the Gradient bigger hence
the effective added noise is reduced.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we studied the consensus-based distributed
optimization algorithm when the data points are distributed
across several trusted nodes and the privacy of each data point
is important against an adversary that oversees communica-
tions across nodes. In order to protect the privacy of users,
each node perturbs it’s local state with an additive noise before
sending it out to its neighbors. Differential privacy is a rigorous
privacy criterion for data analysis that provides meaningful
guarantees regardless of what an adversary knows ahead of
time about individuals’ data. We considered (ε,δ )-DP as the
privacy measure and we derived the amount of noise needed
in order to guarantee privacy of each data point. We further
showed that the parameters converge to a neighborhood of the
optimal point, and the size of the neighborhood is proportional
to the privacy metrics.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 3. Recall from (8) that zi(t) is a func-
tion of {y(t)}tt=1, therefore conditioned on the same set of
messages {y(t)}tt=1 we have the following ,
‖xDi (t)− xD
′
i (t)‖2 (39)
= ‖ProjX
(
zDi (t)−ηt∇ f Di (zDi (t))
)
−ProjX
(
zD
′
i (t)−ηt∇ f D
′
i (z
D′
i (t))
)
‖
(a)
≤ ηt‖∇ f Di (zDi (t))−∇ f D
′
i (z
D′
i (t))‖
(b)
≤ 2ηtG,
where (a) follows from non-expansiveness of the projection
operator and Assumption 2 implies (b). Taking the supermom
from both sides of (39) implies the result directly.
Proof of Theorem 1. In order to prove Algorithm 1 satisfies
(ε,δ )-DP, we check condition (14) in Proposition 1. Recall
that the adversary can only observe messages among nodes
and the privacy loss random variable is a function of these
observations. We derive an analytical expression for the pri-
vacy loss random variable and bound it using concentration
inequalities.
Note that we can write the pdf of y(1), · · · ,y(T ) as follows:
pdfD(y(1), · · · ,y(T )) =∏
t
pdfD(y(t+1)|y(1), · · · ,y(t))
(a)
=∏
t
pdfD(y(t+1)|y(t))
(b)
=∏
t
∏
k∈[N]
pdfD(yk(t+1)|y(t))
(c)
=∏
t
∏
k∈[N]
pMt (yk(t+1)− xk(t))),
where (a) follows since the randomness comes from the
additive noise (11) and y(t + 1) conditioned on n(t) (and
therefore y(t)) is independent of all the previous coin tosses
of the algorithm. Noise injected independently across nodes
which implies (b). In (c), we wrote the conditional pdf of
yk(t+1) in terms of density function of a Gaussian, pMt .
Let us denote the privacy loss random variable for T stages
with c(y(1), · · · ,y(T )). We distinguish the variables associated
with neighboring database D′ with ′. In the context of this
problem, neighboring databases differ in at most one data
point, i.e., at most one node may have a different function.
We denote this node with k∗ ∈ [N].
c(y(1), · · · ,y(T )) = log pdfD(y(1), · · · ,y(T ))
pdfD′(y(1), · · · ,y(T ))
(40)
=∑
t
∑
k∈[N]
−‖yk(t+1)− xk(t)‖2
2M2t
+
‖yk(t+1)− x′k(t)‖2
2M2t
=∑
t
∑
k∈[N]
‖xk(t)− x′k(t)‖2
2M2t
+
2〈yk(t+1)− xk(t),xk(t)− x′k(t)〉
2M2t
=∑
t
∑
k∈[N]
‖xk(t)− x′k(t)‖2
2M2t
+∑
t
∑
k∈[N]
〈nk(t),
(xk(t)− x′k(t))
M2t
〉
(a)
=∑
t
‖xk∗(t)− x′k∗(t)‖2
2M2t
+∑
t
〈nk∗(t),
(xk∗(t)− x′k∗(t))
M2t
〉,
where (a) follows because only one of the cost functions is
different among neighboring databases, therefore at most one
of the these terms is non-zero (note that we are conditioning
on the same observations {y(t)} across two neighboring
problems).
Recall from the definition of ∆2(t) (13),
∑
t
‖xk(t)− x′k(t)‖2
M2(t)
≤∑
t
∆2(t)
M2(t)
4
= α, (41)
therefore by putting (40) and (41) together,
c(y(1), · · · ,y(T ))≤ α
2
+
T
∑
t=1
〈nk∗(t),
(xk∗(t)− x′k∗(t))
M2t
〉. (42)
In order to bound c we first show the second term in (42)
CT
4
= ∑Tt=1〈nk∗(t),
(xk∗ (t)−x′k∗ (t))
M2t
〉 is sub-Gaussian.
9Definition 5 (sub-Gaussian). A zero mean random variable X
is sub-Gaussian3 if for some σ > 0,
EeλX ≤ eσ2λ 2/2,∀λ ∈ R. (43)
Lemma 4. The second term in (42), CT is sub-Gaussian with
the parameter bounded by
√
α , where α is defined in (41).
Proof. Recall the definition of CT and let us define wt as
follows:
CT
4
=
T
∑
t=1
〈nk∗(t),
(xk∗(t)− x′k∗(t))
M2t
〉,
wt
4
= E[CT |Ft ]−E[CT |Ft−1] = 〈nk∗(t),
(xk∗(t)− x′k∗(t))
M2t
〉,
where Ft is the sigma algebra generated by nk(1), · · · ,nk(t).
Note that wt is conditionally sub-Gaussian with σt ≤ ∆(t)/Mt
since:
E[eλwt |nk(1), · · · ,nk(t−1)] (a)= e
‖xk(t)−x′k(t)‖2
M2t
λ 2/2
(b)
≤ e
∆2(t)
M2t
λ 2/2
, ∀λ ∈ R (44)
here (a) follows since nk(t) is an i.i.d. zero mean random
Gaussian vector with variance of M2t and it’s independent
of Ft−1, and definition of ∆2(t) implies (b). Taking the
conditional expectation of CT with respect to Ft−1 implies,
E[eλCT |FT−1] = eλ ∑
T−1
t=1 wtE[eλwT |FT−1]
(a)
≤ eλ ∑T−1t=1 wt e
∆2(T )
M2T
λ 2/2
,∀λ ∈ R (45)
where (a) follows from (44). By repeating the same argument
and taking the conditional expectation with respect to FT−1,
FT−2 up until F1 we conclude that,
E[eλCT ]≤ e∑
T
t=1
∆2(t)
M2t
λ 2/2
≤ eαλ 2/2, ∀λ ∈ R.
In order to bound the privacy random variable, we use the
following tail bound for sub-Gaussian random variables.
Proposition 4. Assume X is a random variable satisfying (43).
Then we have
P [X > t]≤ e− t
2
2σ2 ,∀t ≥ 0, (46)
Proof. Proof follows directly by applying Chernoff bound
along with condition in (43).
Now we are ready to prove the claim. We show that
P [|c| ≥ ε] ≤ δ where c 4= c(y(1), · · · ,y(T )) as in (40). Note
that,
3There exists several equivalent definitions of sub-Gaussianity in the
literature, see for example [12] Proposition 2.5.2
P [c≥+ε]
(a)
≤ P
[α
2
+CT ≥ ε
] (b)
≤ e−(ε− α2 )2/2α , (47)
P [c≤−ε]
(c)
≤ P [CT ≤−ε]
(d)
≤ e− ε
2
2α , (48)
where (a) follows from inequality (42), (b) is the direct
consequence of Proposition 4, (c) comes from c ≥ CT and
we use the fact that −CT is a sub-Gaussian random variable
along with Proposition 3 in (d). Therefore,
P [|c| ≥ ε] = P [c≥ ε]+P [c≤−ε]≤ 2e−
(ε− α2 )2
2α
(a)
≤ δ . (49)
It is straightforward to verify that (a) holds for
0≤ α ≤ 2ε+4log 2
δ
−2
√(
ε+2log
2
δ
)2
− ε2 (*)
By using the inequality a/2≤ 1−√1−a for |a| ≤ 1 we con-
clude that an specific choice of α = ε
2
ε+2log 2δ
in the statement
of Theorem 1 lies in (∗).
Proof of Lemma 1. Compared to the classical DGD (see for
example [4], [3]) we have an additional projection operator
that we need to take into account. In this case, with a minor
modification we can still bound the distance of individual’s zi
to the average parameter. Let us rewrite xi(t) as follows:
xi(t) = ProjX (zi(t)−ηt∇ fi(zi(t))) = zi(t)+ vi(t) (50)
= zˆt(t)+ui(t)+ vi(t),
where zˆi(t)
4
=∑ j∈Ni wi jy j(t) and ui(t) and vi(t) are defined as
vi(t)
4
= ProjX (zi(t)−ηt∇ fi(zi(t)))− zi(t), (51)
ui(t)
4
= zi(t)− zˆi(t). (52)
We use the notation zˆ(t) = [zˆ1(t); · · · , zˆN(t)], u(t) =
[u1(t); · · · ;uN(t)] and v(t) = [v1(t); · · · ;vN(t)]. In the rest
of proof, we rewrite the mean parameter using Kronecker
product z¯(t) = 1N
(
1TN⊗ IP
)
z(t). In order to bound ‖z(t)−
1
N
(
1N1TN⊗ Ip
)
z(t)‖, we first present a lemma that bounds
‖zˆ(t)− 1N
(
1N1TN⊗ Ip
)
zˆ(t)‖.
Lemma 5. Under Assumption 2, at any time t ≤ T , the
following holds:
‖zˆ(t)− 1
N
(
1N1TN⊗ Ip
)
zˆ(t)‖ (53)
≤ 2
t−1
∑
s=1
β t−s‖n(s)‖+
√
NG
t−1
∑
s=1
ηsβ t−s.
Proof. Observer that plugging (50) into (9) we can write:
zˆ(t) = (W ⊗ Ip)(zˆ(t−1)+u(t−1)+v(t−1))
+(W ⊗ Ip)n(t−1), (54)
where u and v are defined according to (52) and (51) respec-
tively.
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We proceed by bounding each of u(t) and v(t) for t ≤ T . It
is clear that both terms are zero in Stage II of the algorithm.
Bounding u: Note that
‖vi(t)‖2 = ‖ProjX (zi(t)−ηt∇ fi(zi(t)))− zi(t)‖
(a)
= ‖ProjX (zi(t)−ηt∇ fi(zi(t)))−ProjX zi(t)‖
(b)
≤ ‖ηt∇ fi(zi(t))‖2
(c)
≤ Gηt ,
where (a) holds since zi(t) ∈ X , (b) follows from non-
expansiveness property of the Euclidean projection and As-
sumption 2 implies (c). Therefore,
‖v(t)‖2 =
√
N
∑
i
‖vi(t)‖22 ≤ G
√
Nηt . (55)
In order to bound u(t),
‖ui(t)‖2 = ‖zi− zˆi‖2 = ‖ProjX zˆi− zˆi‖2
(a)
≤ ‖(Wi⊗ Ip)n(t)‖2,
where (a) follows from ‖ProjX a−b‖≤ ‖c−b‖,∀c∈X 4 and
the fact that ∑ j wi, jx j(t) ∈X , Wi is the ith row of the weight
matrix. Therefore, we have the following bound on ‖u‖2:
‖u‖2 = ‖(W ⊗ Ip)n(t)‖2 ≤ ‖n(t)‖2. (56)
The rest follows from the classical case [3], [4], by bounding
the deviation of zˆi from 1N ∑
N
i=1 zˆi assuming zero initial states
5
by expanding (54),
‖zˆ(t)− 1
N
(
1N1TN⊗ Ip
)
zˆ(t)‖
(a)
= ‖
t−1
∑
s=0
(
W t−s⊗ Ip− 1N 1N1
T
N⊗ Ip
)
n(s)
+
t−1
∑
s=1
(
W t−s⊗ Ip− 1N 1N1
T
N⊗ Ip
)
(u(s)+v(s))‖
(b)
≤
t−1
∑
s=0
‖W t−s⊗ Ip− 1N 1N1
T
N⊗ Ip‖‖n(s)‖
+
t−1
∑
s=1
‖W t−s⊗ Ip− 1N 1N1
T
N⊗ Ip‖‖u(s)+v(s)‖
(c)
≤
t−1
∑
s=0
β t−s‖n(s)‖+
t−1
∑
s=1
β t−s‖u(s)‖+
t−1
∑
s=1
β t−s‖v(s)‖
(d)
≤
t−1
∑
s=0
β t−s‖n(s)‖+
t−1
∑
s=1
Msβ t−s‖n(s)‖+
√
NG
t−1
∑
s=1
ηsβ t−s
=
t−1
∑
s=1
2β t−s‖n(s)‖+
√
NG
t−1
∑
s=1
ηsβ t−s, (57)
where (a) holds since W is doubly stochastic, (b) follows from
the triangle inequality together with the inequality ‖Ax‖ ≤
‖A‖‖x‖ where ‖A‖ denotes the operator norm6, we use the
4This property follows directly from the definition of projection (10)
5Without loss of generality we assume the initial condition is zero,
otherwise there is an extra term that goes to zero exponentially fast.
6‖Ax‖ ≤ ‖A‖‖x‖ holds for matrix A ∈ Rn×n and x ∈ Rn where ‖A‖ is the
operator norm of a matrix.
spectral property of the weight matrix in (c) and β is defined
as the second largest eigenvalue of W , we plugged in (56) and
(55) to derive (d).
Having set Lemma 5, we bound the the deviation of zi(t)
from the mean parameter for Stage I as follows.
‖z(t)− 1
N
(
1N1TN⊗ Ip
)
z(t)‖ (58)
= ‖
(
IpN− 1N
(
1N1TN⊗ Ip
))
(zˆ(t)+u(t))‖
≤ ‖zˆ(t)− 1
N
(
1N1TN⊗ Ip
)
zˆ(t)‖
+‖
(
IpN− 1N
(
1N1TN⊗ Ip
))
u(t)‖
≤
t−1
∑
s=1
2Msβ t−s‖n(s)‖+
√
NG
t−1
∑
s=1
ηsβ t−s+‖u(t)‖,
where we used Lemma 5, (56) along with triangle inequality
and the inequality ‖Ax‖ ≤ ‖A‖‖x‖.
In Stage II, x(t) = (W ⊗ IP)x(t−1) for t > T , therefore
‖x(t)− 1
N
(
1N1TN⊗ Ip
)
x(t)‖
= ‖(W t−T ⊗ Ip− 1N
(
1N1TN⊗ Ip
)
)x(T )‖
≤ β t−T x(T ), (59)
where we use the spectral property of W .
Proof of Lemma 3. Let us define zˆi(t)
4
= ∑ j∈Ni wi jy j(t), i.e.,
zi(t) = ProjX zˆi(t) therefore
‖zi(t)− x‖ (a)= ‖ProjX zˆi(t)−ProjX x‖
(b)
≤ ‖zˆi(t)− x‖2, (60)
where (a) follows since x∈X and we used non-expansiveness
property of the projection in (b). Summing up both sides of
(60) results in
∑
i∈[N]
‖zi(t)− x‖2 ≤ ∑
i∈[N]
‖zˆi(t)− x‖2 (61)
= ‖zˆ(t)−1N⊗ x‖2
(a)
= ‖(W ⊗ Ip)y(t)−1N⊗ x‖2
(b)
= ‖(W ⊗ Ip)(y(t)−1N⊗ x)‖2
(c)
≤ ‖y(t)−1N⊗ x‖2 = ∑
i∈[N]
‖yi(t)− x‖2,
where (a) follows directly from definition of zˆi(t), W being
doubly stochastic implies (b) and (c) is from the spectral
properties of W .
Note that,
‖yi(t)− x‖2 = ‖xi(t−1)− x‖2+‖ni(t)‖2 (62)
+2〈xi(t−1)− x,ni(t)〉.
The proof is complete by plugging (62) into (61) together and
taking the expectation from both sides.
